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Abstract
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a popular method to deal with
decision-making problems of two-player zero-sum games with imperfect infor-
mation. Unlike existing studies that mostly explore for solving larger scale
problems or accelerating solution efficiency, we propose a framework, RLCFR,
which aims at improving the generalization ability of the CFR method. In the
RLCFR, the game strategy is solved by the CFR in a reinforcement learning
framework. And the dynamic procedure of iterative interactive strategy up-
dating is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP). Our method, RLCFR,
then learns a policy to select the appropriate way of regret updating in the
process of iteration. In addition, a stepwise reward function is formulated to
learn the action policy, which is proportional to how well the iteration strategy
is at each step. Extensive experimental results on various games have shown
that the generalization ability of our method is significantly improved compared
with existing state-of-the-art methods.
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1. Introduction
Machine game is one of the most challenging research directions in the field
of artificial intelligence, which mainly studies the decision-making problem of
players in the environment. According to whether the game state is completely
observable, the machine game can be divided into perfect information game
(PIG) and imperfect information game (IIG). The PIG means that the game
state is completely observable by the game players. On the contrary, the IIG
refers to the game in which the players contain private information to other
players, in other words, the game state may not be completely observable to the
players. For example, in the game of poker, each player’s private hand cards
are unobservable to other players. Because of such hidden information, in order
to solve the IIG, many techniques have been developed to infer or evaluate the
hidden information [1, 2].
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is one of the most classical method
to solve the Nash equilibrium strategy in two-player zero-sum games [3, 4, 5].
There have been many improvements based on the vanilla CFR over the years.
For example, Monte carlo CFR (MCCFR) combines the sampling technique
monte carlo with the vanilla CFR, which greatly expands scalability of solving
problems. CFR+ is a new variant based on the vanilla CFR, which uses the
regret matching+ as its core algorithm to speed up the strategy solving [6, 7].
Discount CFR (DCFR) is the latest variant of CFR based method, which ob-
tains the best performance compared with other CFR based methods [8]. Deep
CFR combines the deep neural network with the LCFR, which approximates
the regret value through the neural network, and such combination further ex-
pands the scale of solving problems [9]. Besides, the CFR based method has also
achieved great success in recent years, especially in poker games [10, 11, 12, 13].
For example, DeepStack [14] and Libratus [15] both use the CFR as the core
algorithm, which have successfully defeated the top human players in two-player
no-limit Texas Hold’em poker. Further, the success of Pluribus that defeats the
human professional players in the six-player no-limit Texas Hold’em poker is
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Figure 1: Evaluation of four CFR based methods on Kuhn poker and Leduc poker. (The
X-axis represents the number of the iteration, the Y-axis represents the exploitability, which
is a classic evaluation metric in the poker games. Here are four curves with different colors,
representing four different methods.)
considered a major breakthrough in the field of artificial intelligence [16].
CFR has achieved great success in the IIG, and has many improvement
methods over the years. [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. However, there is still a
problem needs to be solved: how to improve the generalization of the CFR
based methods. In other words, one method only shows the best performance
in one or several games, and no one method can show excellent performance in
all games. What is more, for a certain game, a method may only show excellent
performance at a certain stage. For example, in the Pluribus [16], two different
CFR-based methods are set to solve the strategy at different iteration times.
To be specific, as shown in Fig. 1, we test four CFR based methods in
two kinds of poker games. The detail of these two poker games and the Y-
axis exploitability will be presented in the section 3 (The exploitability of a
strategy in a two-player zero-sum game is how much worse it dose versus a best
response compared to a Nash equilibrium strategy. The lower the exploitability,
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the better the strategy). Here, we just need to know that the smaller of the
ordinate is, the better the performance of the method can reach. We can find
that in the Kuhn poker, as shown in the Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b), the ECFR is
better than other three mehtods in the first 50th iterations. The ECFR and
the LCFR [9] have significant advantages between 50th iterations and 1000th
iterations (for example, in the iteration of 108, 190, the LCFR performs better
than the ECFR. In the iteration of 60-70, 100, the ECFR performs better).
After the 1000th iterations, the LCFR performs the best. In the Leduc poker,
as shown in the Fig. 1(c) and Fig. 1(d), the ECFR performs better than other
three methods in the early 1500 iterations. And the DCFR [8] and CFR perform
better after 1800th iterations. Thus, it’s clear that no one of the CFR variant
has obtained completely dominate strategy in the two poker games, and such
results further suggest that the existing CFR method has the problem of poor
generalization limitation.
To tackle the above problem, different from the traditional CFR method,
which fixs the way of regret updating, we adopt a dynamic adaptive method to
select different regret updating methods. An agent is designed to dynamically
select the most appropriate regret updating method for different stages of strat-
egy iteration. In this way, the selection of regret updating method is always
optimal in the whole process of iteratively solving strategy, which improves the
generalization ability. Specifically, in the proposed RLCFR, the reinforcement
learning method (RL) is adopted to combined with the CFR. In addition, the
dynamic process of iterative interactive strategy updating can be modeled as a
Markov decision process (MDP), and several regret updating methods can be
regared as the actions of the RLCFR. And, at each step, the RLCFR needs
to decide the action, which refers to the most appropriate of regret updating
method. The above process will be repeated until the maximum number of
interactions is reached.
Experimental results indicate that the proposed RLCFR is robust to three
different poker games. Given the various poker games, our proposed method
shows better generalization ability compared with the state-of-the-art methods.
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We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We put forward a framework, RLCFR, which combines the RL and the
CFR. In the framework, the dynamic process of iterative interactive strat-
egy updating is modeled as a MDP. Unlike most of the existing CFR based
methods that are proposed for solving larger scale problems or accelerating
solution efficiency, we study on how to improve the generalization ability
of CFR based methods.
• We present a new attempt to deal with solving game strategy based on
the CFR in a reinforcement learning framework. Based on our method,
RLCFR, a policy is learned by the agent to select the appropriate re-
gret updating method, which progressively improves the iteration strat-
egy. Moreover, in order to achieve better performance, a stepwise reward
function is formulated to learn the action policy, which is proportional to
how well the iteration strategy is at each step.
• Extensive experimental results show that the generalization ability of our
method RLCFR is significantly improved on various poker games, com-
pared with state-of-the-art methods.
The paper is organized as follows: the overall framework RLCFR and its
details are discussed in Section 2. Then, Section 3 shows experimental results
including performance comparsion with the state-of-the-art methods and abla-
tion studies. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given in Section 4.
2. Methodology
In this section, the dynamic process of iterative interactive strategy updating
is formulated as a MDP firstly. Then, the overall framework of the proposed
RLCFR is illuminated. In addition, the proof of convergence for RLCFR is
given. Finally, the network and training will be presented in details.
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2.1. Problem Definition and Overview of RLCFR
2.1.1. Problem Definition
Given an imperfect information game with two-player, the goal of this paper
is to solve a robust strategy by CFR based methods. Meanwhile, we hope that
this method has a good generalization ability. In addition, for CFR, the core
of it is to solve the problem iteratively through the regret matching algorithm,
which means that the strategy of the next iteration is updated by the regret
value of the current strategy. The iterative updating process of the game G can
be formulated as:
σt = U(G, σ1); Ut = U1 ◦ U2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ut (1)
where G is the game, σt is the strategy for the iteration of t, t is the number of
the iteration. ◦ represents the function composition and U1, U2, . . . , Ut stands
for the specific type of the strategy updating respectively. The ultimate goal is to
get the optimal strategy σt under the same conditions, so that the exploitability
of the strategy σt is minimized.
The procedure of solving the game strategy is a iterative process with two
steps. The first step is to obtain the regret of the current strategy, which is
calculated by conducting the current strategy. The second step is to obtain the
next iteration strategy by the regret matching. This process is repeated until the
termination condition is reached, such as the number of iteration is reaching the
setting value. In the existing methods, the strategy updating method is fixed in
the whole iterative process. From the Fig. 1, it is already shows that the existing
CFR methods [13, 9, 8, 3] has the problem of poor generalization limitation.
In this case, we assume that the way of strategy updating is critical to the
obtained strategy. To address this challenge, we treat the sequential selection
of the way of regret calculation and strategy updating problem as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP), as shown in the Fig 2. Meanwhile, we solve it in a
deep reinforcement learing manner. The overview of the proposed framework
RLCFR (Fig 3 ) is provided in the following.
6
𝑺𝟏
𝒂𝟏
𝑺𝟐 𝑺𝟑
𝒂𝑻−𝟏
𝑺𝑻−𝟏
𝒂𝟐
𝑺𝑻…
…
Figure 2: A Markov decision process for the iterative updating process. (In the game G,
St(σt, R˜t), σt is the strategy and R˜t is the regret of the σt. The action at is a specific way to
update the strategy.)
2.1.2. Overview of RLCFR
The proposed framework aims to improve the generalization ability of the
CFR by selecting different types of regret calculation and strategy updating.
As shown in Fig 3, the proposed RLCFR mainly consists of two componenets,
environment and agent:
(1) Environment (Env). We regard the specific game as the environment,
whcih receives the action selected by the agent. At each step, the Env obtains
the action provided by the agent and makes the last updating strategy as the
current strategy. Then calculates the regret and updates the stratefy of next
iteration. Finally, the Env outputs the exploitability of the current strategy, the
next iteration strategy and the current strategy’s regret.
(2) Agent. RL agent, which is trained by the reinforcement learning method
to select the appropriate types of regret calculation and strategy updating in
every step. The agent can be learned from the input and the reward (the input
is from the Env and the reward is from the reward function). Then the agent
outputs the action to the Env.
The whole interaction process is that the RL agent get rewards through
continuous interaction with the Env, and strategies in the Env are updated
iteratively until the termination condition is reached.
2.2. The component of RLCFR
The process of RLCFR has been introduced before in the Section 2.1. In
this section, we will mainly describe the agent, such as action, state and reward,
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Figure 3: Illustration of our RLCFR framework. (At each step t, the RL agent gets the
current input It from Env, including the regret for each player under the current strategy,
which is the output of the agent at each previous step. In order to maximize the reward rt, an
action at is selected by the agent. After the whole procedure of the regret matching, RLCFR
conducts another step until the max step is reached.)
and then go into the details of the agent structure and the strategy iteration
procedure.
Action. Action is one of the main components of the agent. Assume that
action is represented by a, the action space A, which is composed of all possible
legal actions that the agent can adopt that A = (a1, a2, . . . , an). When the RL
agent performs a step, the agent selects an action at and applies it to the Env.
At this time, according to the current iteration strategy σt, the regret match-
ing algorithm calculates the regret value and the next iteration strategy σt+1
according to the selected action at. Specifically, different actions can be defined
as different ways of regret calculation and strategy updating. In this paper, we
use seven types of regret calculation and strategy updating. In other words,
the action space consists of seven actions, that is A = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7).
These actions come from the CFR based methods in recent years. Details are
described in Tab. 1.
State. State is the observation information of the agent obtained from
environment under the current condition. In the RLCFR, we take the regret
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Table 1: The detail of seven actions
Action Strategy updating and regret calculation
a1 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
RT,+i (I,a)∑
a∈A(I) R
T,+
i (I,a)
, RT,+i (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I) r(I, a)
a2 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
tRT,+i (I,a)∑
a∈A(I) tR
T,+
i (I,a)
, RT,+i (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I) tr(I, a)
a3 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
( tt+1 )
γ
RTi (I,a)∑
a∈A(I)( tt+1 )
γ
RTi (I,a)
, RTi (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I)
tα
tα+1r(I, a)
a4 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
eαRTi (I,a)∑
a∈A(I) R
T
i (I,a)
, RTi (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I) e
αr(I, a)
a5 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
RTi (I,a)∑
a∈A(I) R
T
i (I,a)
, RTi (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I) r(I, a)
a6 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
RTi (I,a)∑
a∈A(I) R
T
i (I,a)
, RTi (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I) r
+(I, a)
a7 σ
T+1
i (I, a) =
1
|A| , R
T
i (I, a) =
∑
a∈A(I) r(I, a)
value of the current strategy as the output St, and the input of the agent It
is the vector of the regret value of the last three iterations, which is a three-
dimensional vector that It = (St−2, St−1, St). At the step 1, I1 can be initialized
randomly.
Reward. Reward is a basic element of reinforcement learning method. Ap-
propriate reward setting can not only accelerate the convergence of the training
model, but also make the trained agent more robust. In addition, duo to the ex-
ploitability is a very objective evaluation metric of the current iteration strategy,
the lower of the exploitability is, the better of the current strategy is. Therefore,
we hope that the reward can be associated with at each step. Thus, a stepwise
reward is designed as follows:
R2 =
 E
′
t − Et, if E
′
t − Et ≥ 0
E
′
t − Et, otherwise
(2)
where E
′
t is the lowest exploitability of the comparison methods under the same
number of iterations.
In general, the accumulated reward of one interactive sequence is as follows:
Ri = Σ
T
t=1γ
t−1rti (3)
where T is the number of the total step, γ is the discount factor and its value
is between 0 and 1.
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Env. In the reinforcement learning, the agent is improveed by constantly
interacting with the environment. It is worth noting that in RLCFR, although
the Env here is built by ourselves, it is not different from the general environ-
ment, and also includes the same elements of the environment. The Env receives
the action output by the agent for execution, and generates the next state and
corresponding rewards. Specially, the Env receives the action output from the
agent and executes the current strategy σt in the IIG. Then the way of regret
updating and regret calculation is selected through the received action for the
regret matching algorithm. Finally, the Env outputs the exploitability Et and
the regret R˜t of the current strategy, and the updated strategy σt+1 for the next
iteration.
2.3. Proof of The Convergence
In this section we prove a bound for the proposed approach RLCFR when
calculating the average strategy. Theorem 1 shows the RLCFR has a conver-
gence bound.
Theorem 1 Assume that the number of the iteration T of the RLCFR,
which is played in a two-player zero-sum game. Then the weighted average
strategy profile is a 2
∆|I|
√
|A|√
T
-Nash equilibrium.
The proof is provided in the appendix, which combines the the proof for the
vanilla CFR [3], CFR+ [6, 7] and the discount CFR [8].
2.4. Training of RLCFR
In this section, the agent is trained based on the RL. In RLCFR, the simpli-
fied version of the deep Q-larning (DQN) is used to train the agent. Compared
with the vanilla DQN [23], there is no complex input similar to the image in
RLCFR, thus we remove the convolutional neural network and only use full con-
nection to construct the network of the RLCFR. In addition, like the original
DQN, we also use the target network. The loss function in RLCFR is a mean
square error (MSE),
L =
1
2
||y − y′ ||22 (4)
10
As for the agent, part of the supervision information we used when setting
up the reward function to train the agent (the minimum exploitability of each
CFR method at the same number of iterations). And in the training procedure
of the agent, the goal is to minimize the loss function. In addition, the loss
function of the agent is the same as the vanilla DQN. The loss function L can
be rewrited with:
L = (yt −Q(st, a))2 (5)
the yt is as follows:
yt =
 rt + γmaxa′Qt+1,a′ , T > t ≥ 1rT , t = T (6)
where Qa is the action value of the action a, γ is a discount factor and the value
is set to 0.99.
3. Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of our
proposed RLCFR in terms of the exploitability, as compared with the state-of-
the-art methods. In addition, we investigate different settings of the proposed
RLCFR.
3.1. Experimental Platform
We perform experiments on the poker games, which are the most classic and
universal testing platform in the field of the IIG in recent years. Since the poker
game contains private hand and includes all the elements of the IIG, it can well
evaluate the method of the IIG. In addition, in recent years, the successful IIG
methods (for example, DeepStack [14], Libratus [15], Pluribus [16]) adopt the
poker game as the test platform for experimental testing. Therefore, in this
paper, we also take poker games as our experimental platform. Specifically,
three kinds of poker games are used as test platforms in the paper. They are
all simple versions of Texas Hold’em poker, which are enough to verify the
effectiveness of our method.
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Table 2: The detail of three kinds of poker
Poker Total cards Public/private cards Round Ante Betsize
Kuhn 3 0/1 1 1 1
Leduc 6 1/1 2 1 2; 4
Royal 8 2/1 3 1 2; 4; 4
The three kinds of poker games are Kuhn poker, Leduc poker, Royal poker
respectively. The Kuhn poker has two game players and only one round, preflop.
Each game player has one private hand and the game has three cards totally.
The Leduc poker has two game players and two rounds, preflop and flop. Each
game player has one hand and the game has six cards totally. Each game player
is issued a private hand firstly in the round of preflop, and then a public card
will be issued in the round of flop. The Royal poker also has two game players
and three rounds, preflop, flop, and turn. Each game player has one private
hand and the game has eight cards totally. Each game player is issued a private
hand firstly in the round of preflop, and then a public card will be issued in the
round of flop and turn respectively. Besides, the actions fold, call, and raise are
legal actions in the poker games. The detail of these three kinds of poker games
are introduced in the Tab. 2.
3.2. Experimental Settings
Evaluation metrics. Exploitability is a natural and standard evaluation
metric in the field of the IIG. In this paper, the exploitability is used to evaluate
the strategy solved by the method. The exploitability of a strategy in a two-
player zero-sum game is how much worse it dose versus a best response compared
to a Nash equilibrium strategy. The lower the exploitability, the better the
strategy.
Note that the best response to the strategy σp is a strategy Br(σp), in
which up(σp, Br(σp)) = maxσ′−p
ui(σp, σ
′
−p). A Nash equilibrium strategy σ
∗ is
a strategy profile, in which every player plays a best response: ∀p, up
(
σ∗p , σ
∗
−p
)
=
12
maxσ′p up
(
σ′p, σ
∗
−p
)
. Thus, the exploitability of a strategy can be descripted as:
e (σp) = up
(
σ∗p, Br
(
σ∗p
))− up (σp, Br (σp)) (7)
Implementation details. Our method RLCFR is combining the DRL
and CFR based methods to improve generalization ability. Specifically, we use
DQN for action selection, which we call it as dqn1 [23]. Among them, the
dqn1 is slightly different from the vanilla DQN presented by DeepMind. The
biggest difference is that the dqn1 only use a four-layer fully connected network
to achieve our goal, which does not apply the convolutional neural network.
Due to a fully connected network is enough to encode the state in the RLCFR.
Besides, other parameters in the dqn1 are: batch size is 32, discount factor is
0.99, replay memory size is 2000, exploration is 0.1. In addition, the target
network updates for every 200 steps. The model training and testing on a PC
with i7-7700 CPU, 16G RAM. The program language used is python 3.6 and
pytorch.
3.3. Experimental Results
In order to verify the effectiveness of our method RLCFR, we carried out
two groups of experiments totally. Firstly, we compared with the state-of-the-
art methods in the field of the IIG, which is in the first group of experiment.
Secondly, we conducted ablation studies, including the reward function setting
and the action setting. The rest experiments are all about ablation experiments
except the first group experiment. In addition, in order to ensure the fairness of
the experimental results and reduce the errors caused by the randomness. Thus
we have carried out each group of experiments three times respectively and the
final experimental results take the mean value.
3.3.1. Comparisons with state-of-the-art methods
We compare RLCFR with four state-of-the-art methods: CFR [3], LCFR [9],
DCFR [8], ECFR. Among them, the DCFR is the CFR based method with the
best performance that has been published. In addition, the performance of the
13
Table 3: The brief description of the four comparison methods
Method Brief description
CFR It is proposed by Zinkevich et al. in 2007 [3], which is the first
method to use regret matching to solve the poker games.
LCFR It is proposed by Noam Brown et al. in 2019 [9], which is identical
to the CFR, except the regret is weighed by the iteration.
DCFR It is proposed by Noam Brown et al. in 2019 [8], which is a variant
of the CFR that discount prior iterations, leading to stronger
performance than the prior state-of-the-art methods.
ECFR It is also based on the vanilla CFR method and is proposed by us.
The ECFR also shows excellent performance through exponential
decay of the CFR.
ECFR is also very excellent. However, this is our recent work and it has not yet
officially published. Thus here we still describe the DCFR as the method with
best performance at present. The brief description of the these four comparison
methods are in Tab. 3.
In order to make the experimental results more fair, we carried out three
verification experiments on three kinds of poker games. The final results come
from the mean of three validation experiments. In addition, the number of
iterations of the strategy is 10000 in the validation experiment. The model
selected in the validation experiment is an optimal model after the ablation
study, which will be described later. The results are shown in Fig. 4, Fig. 5
and Fig. 6, which are tested on the Kuhn poker, Leduc poker and Royal poker
respectively. The lower the exploitability, the better the strategy.
In the Fig. 4(c), we can find that the RLCFR converges with the iteration
increases, which shows that our method has good convergence on the Kuhn
poker. Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) shows the detail of the experimental results. In
the first 100th iterations, the performance of the RLCFR is very close to that
of the ECFR, except for a limited number of iterations (at n = 8, 9, 50, 85).
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Figure 4: Comparisons with state-of-the-art methods on the Kuhn. (The X-axis represents
the number of the iteration, the Y-axis represents the exploitability that is a classic evaluation
metric in the poker games. The smaller of the exploitability, the better. Here are five curves
of different colors, representing five different methods. Our mehtod RL-CFR is represented
with a solid red line. The other four comparison mehtods are represented with dashed lines
with different colors.)
After 100th iterations, the performance of the RLCFR is gradually better than
that of the ECFR, and it is obviously better than other methods.
In the Fig. 5(c), we can also find that the RLCFR converges gradually with
the increase of iterations. Besides, in addition to a limited number of iterations,
the performance is equal to that of ECFR, and we can clearly see that the
performance of the RLCFR is ahead of other methods in the iteration process.
The same convergence can still be obtained from the Fig. 6(c). We find that in
the first 200th iterations, as shown in Fig. 6(a), the performance of the RLCFR
is close to that of the ECFR and there is no dominant trend. However, in the
later iterations, especially after 900th iterations, we can obviously find that our
method RLCFR is better than the ECFR, which is shown in Fig. 6(b).
To sum up, firstly, our method RLCFR has a good convergence with the in-
crease of the iterations, which has been verified in the three experiments on three
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Figure 5: Comparisons with state-of-the-art methods on the Leduc. (The X-axis represents
the number of the iteration, the Y-axis represents the exploitability. The smaller of the
exploitability, the better.)
different poker games respectively. Secondly, the generalization of our method
has been well verified, and our method has shown nearly leading performance
in these three different poker games. In addition, our model is trained on Kuhn
poker and Leduc poker, while the test is conducted on three kinds of poker
games and the additional Royal poker has the largest scale among the three
kinds of Poker games. However, our method still shows excellent performance
in the Royal poker, which further proves that our method has good generaliza-
tion ability. Finally, from the Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we can find that when
the performance of several methods is alternately dominant, our method does
not oscillate like a single method. On the contrary, our method can keep the
optimal or nearly optimal in this kind of situation. This shows that our method
is effective in the selection of strategy updating in the iterative process.
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Figure 6: Comparisons with state-of-the-art methods on the Royal. (The X-axis represents
the number of the iteration, the Y-axis represents the exploitability. The smaller of the
exploitability, the better.)
3.3.2. Ablation studies
In this section, we investigate different settings of the proposed RLCFR,
and give some insights on the choice of each factor. There are two groups
experiments to analyze. Firstly, we analyze the effect of different reward settings
to the algorithm performance. Secondly, we analyze the effect of different action
settings on the performance of the algorithm. It should be noted that the test
model we used in the first group of experiments (comparisons with state-of-
the-art methods) came from the best combination selected here. In each of
the four groups of experiments, we also conducted five repeated experiments
to ensure the effectiveness of the experimental results. The final experimental
results come from the mean of five repeated experiments.
Reward setting. The reward function is a very important part of the
reinforcement learning. An appropriate reward function can accelerate the con-
vergence of the reinforcement learning. Since we also use the deep reinforcement
learning method in this paper, it is necessary to set the reward reasonably. In
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addition, the purpose of using reinforcement learning method is to select an
appropriate action through reinforcement learning method, and to select the
strategy updating method in CFR based methods. The evaluation standard of
the CFR methods is exploitability. Thus, we can find the reward function is
very related to the exploitability.
Due to the CFR is an iterative algorithm, with the increase of iterations, the
solution strategy should be stronger and stronger. In terms of the exploitability,
with the increase of iterations, the exploitability should be lower and lower.
Based on the above analysis, we set up three different rewards, which are called
R1, R2, R3.
R1: we compare the exploitability of the two steps before and after, since
the lower the exploitability is, the better. Thus when the exploitability develops
according to this trend, we will give a positive reward, otherwise it will be a
negative reward. As showed in the Eq. 8.
R1 =
 1, if Et−1 − Et > 0−1, otherwise (8)
where t is the number of the iteration, Et−1 and Et is the exploitability of the
RLCFR under the previous iteration and the current iteration.
R2: In the previous completed experiments, we found that in most cases, the
exploitability decreased gradually. That is to say, according to the R1 setting,
the reward is positive in most cases. Due to the punishment is too little, it
has influence on the training of the RL model. Moreover, it will cause the
model to actually choose risky actions when facing some states, but the model
is not considered as risky actions. Therefore, we have improved R1 and added
a benchmark to R1, through the exploitability we have obtained from various
comparison methods in each iteration. As depicted in the Eq. 9.
R2 =
 E
′
t − Et, if E
′
t − Et ≥ 0
E
′
t − Et, otherwise
(9)
where E
′
t is the lowest exploitability of the comparison methods under the same
number of iterations.
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R3: At the same time, the attenuation rate of the exploitability is also
worth considering. For the iterative method, the number of iterations setting
in practical application is limited. The fewer iteration is used to achieve the
same exploitability, the more beneficial to the practical application. Therefore,
we add an additional bonus item in R3 to encourage corresponding actions that
lead to faster attenuation speed. As showed in the Eq. 10.
R3 =

E
′
t−Et
E
′
t
, if E
′
t − Et ≥ 0
1
kt−kt−1 , if kt − kt−1 > 0
E
′
t−Et
E
′
t
, otherwise
(10)
where kt is the slope, which is described as
E
t
′−Et
t−t′ , here t
′
< t. E
′
t is the lowest
exploitability of the comparison methods under the same number of iterations.
t is the number of the iteration, Et−1 and Et is the exploitability of the RLCFR
under the previous iteration and the current iteration.
In this study, we tested the three kinds of the reward to find an appropriate
reward in the RLCFR. The training steps here is 20000. The related experiental
results are showed in Fig. 7. The model loss and the exploitability are used to
evaluate our results respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 7(a), the model used R1
converges fast compared with the other two. Although the models used R2 and
R3 converge finally after the 10000 steps. From the Fig. 7(b), we find that the
model used R2 performs the best. In addition, the model of R3 does not show
the expected effect. This is mainly due to the rapid decline in exploitability in
the early stage, and the use of slope can be beneficial to provide more incentive
information. However, in the later iteration, the exploitability decreases slowly,
and the attenuation slope decreases all the time. This is equivalent to punishing
the agent without rewards, which makes the model training of the agent more
difficult. Finally, since our ultimate goal is to reduce the exploitability of the
method, we choose the R2 as the reward function.
Actions. The action is one of the basic concepts of the RL. Reasonable
action settings have a great influence on the RL methods. In our proposed
method RLCFR, based on the analysis of CFR methods, we set up four neces-
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Figure 7: Ablation study on reward functions. (The X-axis represents the number of the step,
the Y-axis represents the exploitability. The smaller of the exploitability, the better.)
sary actions. In addition, we added three actions to explore their impact on the
RL. The first action is based on the idea of vanilla regret matching algorithm,
which is to follow the process of updating regret completely without additional
preprocessing. The second action is also from a very direct motivation, which
is just to accumulate the positive regret and use the positive regret to update
the strategy. It should be noted that this action is different from the action
update of the CFR. The CFR only preprocesses the regret when the strategy
is updating. The third action is random strategy updating. The consideration
of adding this action is to increase the randomness of the action and ultimately
increase the flexibility of the training model.
We call the three additional actions as a5, a6, a7 respectively. In addition,
in order to distinguish the four basic actions, we express the four basic actions
as a1, a2, a3, a4. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the actions a5, a6, a7, we
compare the results with/without the actions a5, a6, a7. As can be seen in
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Figure 8: Ablation study on actions. (The X-axis represents the number of the step, the
Y-axis represents the exploitability. The smaller of the exploitability, the better.)
Fig. 8, we can find that no matter from the perspective of loss or exploitability,
the added actions are helpful to the training model. Although six actions and
seven actions are similar in exploitability, the loss of the model using seven
actions decreases faster. In addition, seven actions can increase the agent’s
exploratory ability by randomly adopting updating strategies. Therefore, we
finally chose seven actions in the test model.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, in order to improve the generalization ability of CFR based
methods, we put forward a framework, RLCFR, which combines the RL and the
CFR. In the framework, the dynamic process of iterative interactive strategy
updating is modeled as a Markov decision process. We present a new attempt to
deal with solving game strategy based on the CFR in a reinforcement learning
framework. Based on our method, RLCFR, a policy is learned by the agent to
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select the appropriate regret updating method, which progressively improves the
iteration strategy. Moreover, in order to achieve better performance, a stepwise
reward function is formulated to learn the action policy, which is proportional
to how well the iteration strategy at each step. Extensive experimental results
on three kinds of games verified the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the weighted sequence of iterations Consider the weighted sequence
of iterations σ′1, . . . , σ′T , where σ′t is identical to σt, but weighted by wt. The
regret of action a in information set I on iteration t of this new sequence is
R
′t(I, a).
Theorem 1 Assume that the number of the iteration T of the RLCFR,
which is played in a two-player zero-sum game. Then the weighted average
strategy profile is a 2
∆|I|
√
|A|√
T
-Nash equilibrium.
The proof is provided in the following, which combines the the proof for the
vanilla CFR [3], CFR+ [6, 7] and the discount CFR [8].
Proof. The lowest amount of the instant regret on any iteration is −∆. Con-
sider the weighted sequence of iterations σ′1, . . . , σ′T , where σ′t is identical to σt,
but the weight wa,t =
∏T−1
i=t i =
(T−1)!
t! rather than wa,t = (1, e
α, t, ( tt+1 )
γ , 1, 1, 1).
R′t(I, a) is the regret of the action a on the information set I at the iteration t,
for this new sequence.
Here, we have made a contraction of wa,t. wa,t = (1, e
α, t, ( tt+1 )
γ , 1, 1, 1) ≤
(t, t, t, t, t, t, t). In the RLCFR, it needs to be noted that we select the way of
strategy updating with the iteration increases. Specifically, the weight varies
as the number of iteration increases. About wa,t = (1, e
α, t, ( tt+1 )
γ , 1, 1, 1), it
stands for seven kinds of weights, which comes from seven different ways of
strategy updating. Moreover, one is selected to be adopted from seven kinds of
weights on each iteration in the paper.
In addition, for the regret matching [2], which proves that if
∑∞
t=1 wt =∞,
then the weighted average regret that defined as Rw,Ti = maxa∈A
∑T
t=1(wtr
t(a))∑T
t=1 w
t
can be bounded by the Rw,Ti ≤
∆
√
|A|
√∑T
t=1 w
2
t∑T
t=1 wt
.
We can find that Rt(I, a) ≤ ∆√|A|√T for the player i’ action a on the
information set I, from the lemma 3. We can use the Lemma 1, which uses the
weight wα,t for the iteration t with B = ∆
√|A|√T and C = 0. It means that
R′t(I, a) ≤ wT (B − C) ≤ ∆
√|A|√T from the Lemma 1. Furthermore, we get
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the weighted average regret is at most ∆
√|A|√T from the Lemma 3. Since for
the information set, |I1|+ |I2| = |I|, and as T →∞, R
T
i
T → 0. Therefore, in the
two-player zero-sum game, this weighted average strageties form a 2
∆|I|
√
|A|√
T
-
Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Call a sequence x1, . . . , xT of bounded real values BC-plausible
if B > 0, C ≤ 0,∑it=1 xt ≥ C for all i, and ∑Tt=1 xt ≤ B. For any BC -plausible
sequence and any sequence of non-decreasing weights wt ≥ 0,
∑T
t=1 (wtxt) ≤
wT (B − C).
Lemma 2. Given a group of actions A and any sequence of rewards vt,
such that |vt(a)− vt(b)| ≤ ∆ for all t and all a, b ∈ A, after conducting a set
of strategies decided by the regret matching, however applying the regret-like
value Qt(a) instead of Rt(a), QT (a) ≤ ∆√|A|T for all a ∈ A.
Proof. This Lemma is closely resembling Lemma 1, which are both from [6],
thus here we donot give the detailed proof of these two lemmas.
Lemma 3. Suppose the player i conducts T iterations of the ECFR, then
the weighted regret for the player i is at most ∆ |Ii|
√|A|√T , and the weighted
average regret for the player i is at most
∆|Ii|
√
|A|√
T
.
Proof. The weight of the iteration t < T is wt =
∏T−1
i=t i. Therefore, for all
iteration t,
∑T
t=1 w
2
t ≤
∑T
t=1[
(T−1)!
t! ]
2 ≤ T [(T − 1)!]2. In addition, ∑Tt=1 wt ≥
(T − 1)!.
Through Rw,Ti ≤
∆
√
|A|
√∑T
t=1 w
2
t∑T
t=1 wt
and the Lemma 2, we can find that Qw,Ti ≤
∆
√
|A|
√∑T
t=1 w
2
t∑T
t=1 wt
≤ ∆√|A|√T . Due to RTi ≤∑I∈Ii RT (I) [2], we can find that
Qw,Ti ≤ ∆ |Ii|
√|A|√T . Since Rw,Ti ≤ Qw,Ti , thus Rw,Ti ≤ ∆ |Ii|√|A|√T .
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